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ARTICLES
South Africa's "Independent" Homelands:
An Exercise in Denationalization
JOHN DUGARD
The South African Government's policy of apartheid or separate de-
velopment has achieved considerable notoriety over the past thirty years.
To most informed persons the term apartheid conjures up a discrimina-
tory legal order in which personal, social, economic, political, and educa-
tional rights are distributed unequally on the basis of race. Recent devel-
opments on the apartheid front are less notorious. Since 1976, the South
African Government has resorted to the fictional use of statehood and
nationality in order to resolve its constitutional problems. New "states"
have been carved out of the body of South Africa and been granted inde-
pendence, and all black" persons affiliated with these entities, however
remotely, have been deprived of their South African nationality. In this
way the government aims to create a residual South African state with no
black nationals. The millions of Blacks who continue to reside and work
in South Africa will be aliens, with no claim to political rights in South
Africa. In this way, so the government believes, Blacks will be given full
political and civil rights in their own states and a hostile international
community will be placated. A number of studies have examined this ex-
ercise in political fantasy from the perspective of statehood in interna-
tional law.' Although the present study will trace the development of the
homelands policy and describe the creation of "independent" homelands,
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the main focus will be upon denationalization and upon the important
role it plays in the ideology of separate development. Since this issue has
already given rise to much bitterness in South Africa, it is essential that
the international community appreciate more fully an issue which threat-
ens the already fragile racial peace that exists in South Africa.
I. HOMELANDS POLICY AND IDEOLOGY
The National Party Government of South Africa is clearly and firmly
opposed to the sharing of political power in a unitary South Africa. On
the dther hand, it accepts the fact that both internal and external forces
require the extension of political rights to Blacks. Hence, it has developed
the homelands policy by which Blacks will be given political rights in
their own "states" and Whites will retain exclusive political control over
the remaining part of the Republic of South Africa, comprising eighty-
seven percent of the original territory of South Africa.
The homelands policy evolved slowly in the early years of National
Party rule, accelerated after 1959, and reached its peak in 1976 on the
granting of independence to Transkei. At that stage, and indeed until the
retirement of Mr. B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister in 1978, the final goals
were clear: all homelands would become independent states; the entire
black population of the Republic would be granted political rights and
citizenship in these independent states; and, consequently, there ulti-
mately would be no black citizens of the Republic of South Africa requir-
ing accommodation in South Africa's political order. The "purity" of this
ideology has been abandoned by the Government of Mr. P.W. Botha.
There is now talk of a constellation or confederation of states in southern
Africa in which Blacks will possess the nationality of the proposed con-
federation while exercising their citizenship rights mainly within black
member states of the confederation. Moreover, the permanency of the
black urban population appears to have been recognized at long last as a
political fact. Mr. Botha's plans are at present confined largely to rheto-
ric, however, and the institutional structure of 1976 still dominates the
statute book. This accounts for the difficulty in describing the present
homelands policy.
For a clear understanding of homelands policy and ideology as re-
flected in the present legal order, it is necessary to examine the evolution
of this policy in the context of the internal and external forces which have
shaped it.
A. The Period 1948 to 1976
Race separation has been a dominant feature of policymaking in
South Africa since the advent of the white man. On occasion this resulted
in separate areas being set aside for exclusive occupation by Blacks. But
until recent times there was no suggestion that separate states should be
created for Blacks. On the contrary, the historical trend in South Africa
in the first part of this century was towards unity and expansion in state-
building, as evidenced by the Union in 1910 and by the attempts, albeit
unsuccessful, on the part of successive South African governments to in-
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corporate the High Commission Territories (comprising Basutoland,
Bechuanaland, and Swaziland), South West Africa, and Southern Rhode-
sia into a greater South Africa.
When the National Party came to power in 1948 it promised, and
practiced, more separation and more discrimination. The Bantu Authori-
ties Act of 1951,1 which provided for the establishment of tribal, regional,
and territorial authorities, was certainly aimed at strengthening the
power of tribal authorities in the "reserves," as the homelands were then
known, but there was still no hint of territorial fragmentation of South
Africa.
National Party spokesmen argue that the notion of independent
homelands was a logical evolutionary consequence of apartheid or sepa-
rate development. A more realistic explanation, however, is that this radi-
cal change in direction was a result of the new international order and its
expectations.
Toward the end of the 1950's it had become clear that the baaskap
(boss-ship) form of apartheid could no longer be retained as official
policy. The government was compelled to produce a new version of apart-
heid in line with contemporary international standards or to accept the
inevitability of a common society. It chose the former. In 1959 the Pro-
motion of Bantu Self-Government Act4 was introduced to pave the way
for "self-governing Bantu units." At this stage there seemed to be no cer-
tainty that self-government would lead to independence, though the
Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, did tell Parliament that "if it is
within the power of the Bantu and if the territories in which he now lives
can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way."5 This act
was premised heavily on the principle of self-determination of nations, a
principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and constituting
the cornerstone of the powerful decolonization movement. Thus, in intro-
ducing this legislation, Dr. Verwoerd informed Parliament that "the
choice of separate Bantu development" was "in line with the objects of
the world at large."6
In the early 1960's, external pressure intensified as a result of the
Sharpeville tragedy (which led to the first Security Council resolution on
apartheid) and of the institution of legal proceedings against South Africa
over South West Africa before the International Court of Justice. Conse-
quently, the new idealism of self-development, inherent in the notion of
self-government for "Bantu national units," was emphasized with new
vigor. At the same time Dr. Verwoerd admitted that it was a policy that
had been imposed as a result of external pressure. In 1961 he told Parlia-
ment that South Africa was compelled to choose between sacrificing
3. Act 68 of 1951.
4. Act 46 of 1959.
5. 101 House of Assembly Debates, col. 6221, May 20, 1959.
6. Id. col. 6236.
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apartheid completely or making concessions within the framework of the
policy of separate development by allowing the different "Bantu nations"
in South Africa to develop into "separate Bantu states." Then he added:
That is not what we would have liked to see. It is a form of fragmen-
tation which we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In
the light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa there is, how-
ever, no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buy-
ing for the white man his freedom and his right to retain domination
in what is his country .... If the Whites could have continued to
rule over everybody, with no danger to themselves, they would cer-
tainly have chosen to do so. However, we have to bear in mind the
new views in regard to human rights,. . . the power of the world and
world opinion and our desire to preserve ourselves.7
The next step in the evolution of self-development and the appease-
ment of world opinion was the hurried granting of self-government to
Transkei in 19638 in order to provide evidence before the International
Court of Justice of the sincerity of South Africa's intentions under its
separate development program. In the proceedings before the Court in
1965 relating to the dispute over South West Africa, South Africa re-
ferred to the constitutional development of Transkei as evidence of its
intention to grant independence to the different ethnic groups in South
Africa.' In his testimony before the Court, Dr. Eiselen, one of the archi-
tects of the policy of separate development, cited as an example of the
government's homelands policy the "legislation... passed by Parliament
so that the Transkei is now an independent part of South Africa, still
belonging in certain ways to the Republic of South Africa but indepen-
dent in most ways."10 Constitutionally, it was a gross exaggeration to de-
scribe the Transkei of 1965 as "independent in most ways," but this
statement illustrates quite clearly the purpose that Transkeian self-gov-
ernment was meant to serve.
The pace of separate development slowed down considerably in the
mid-1960's. This was probably due to the death of its creator, Dr. H.F.
Verwoerd, and to the technical victory achieved in the South West Africa
Cases, which removed the fear of an adverse judgment enforceable by the
Security Council of the United Nations.
In the late sixties and early seventies new international forces
prompted a further acceleration of self-government for "Bantu national
units." Protests against apartheid at the United Nations continued un-
abated, and the Security Council first exercised jurisdiction over South
West Africa in 1968, but the South African Government had now decided
to outmaneuver the United Nations by means of its "outward policy,"
which was primarily aimed at winning friends in Africa. While the stick
7. 107 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 4191-93, Apr. 10, 1961.
8. TRANSKM CONST. Act 48 of 1963.
9. Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6.
10. 10 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. Pleadings 103.
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of world opinion had been responsible for the initial move toward self-
government for black nations, it was the carrot of African support and
"dialogue" which led to an acceleration of this policy. South Africa
dropped its rigid refusal to discuss domestic policy and indicated that
dialogue with African leaders included discussion of South Africa's racial
policies. If such discussions were to be meaningful, however, it would be-
come necessary for self-development to be presented in a more positive
manner."' The notion of self-government for Black nations was thus
revived.
The first step was the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970,1
which provided that every Black who was not a "citizen" of a self-gov-
erning territory would become a "citizen" of the territorial authority area
to which he was attached by birth, domicile, or cultural affiliation. Then,
in 1971, came the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act,"3 which empow-
ered the government to grant constitutions substantially similar to that
conferred on the Transkei in 1963 to territorial authorities, after consul-
tation with them. Although no provision was made for the granting of
independence to homelands in this 1971 Act, both its preamble and the
White Paper accompanying it affirmed the intention of the government to
lead the homelands to self-government and independence.
After 1971 the homelands advanced rapidly toward self-government:
by January 1977, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu,
Qwaqwa, and KwaZulu had become self-governing. Meanwhile, in 1974,
the Transkei indicated that it would opt for independence, and constitu-
tional planning to that end was soon set in motion.
B. The Period 1976 to 1978
In 1976 Transkei was granted independence. Prior to the granting of
independence to Transkei it was generally believed that international rec-
ognition of the homelands was of fundamental importance to the South
African Government. Transkeian independence was primarily aimed at
the assuagement of world opinion. Recognition must, therefore, have con-
stituted one of the main objectives of independence, in much the same
way as recognition is viewed as essential to the creation of an indepen-
dent Namibia.
Although the General Assembly of the United Nations had already
called upon its members to refuse recognition to Transkei or to any other
homeland before 1976,'1 it seems that both Transkei and South Africa
believed that recognition would be forthcoming, at least from South Af-
rica's Western friends. This is evidenced by the fact that the South Afri-
11. Barratt, South Africa's Outward Policy: From Isolation to Dialogue, reprinted in
SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE 543, 559-61 (1972).
12. Act 26 of 1970, now termed the-Black States Citizenship Act.
13. Act 21 of 1971, now termed the Black States Constitution Act.
14. G.A. Res. 3151G, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 32, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A.
Res. 3411D, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 37, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
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can Department of Foreign Affairs set about training Transkeian diplo-
mats for posts in the main Western countries before independence. To
many familiar with the international scene this appeared to be misplaced
optimism, but it was a gamble that might have succeeded had the new
state of Transkei been structured in such a manner that it would not look
like a means of achieving the ultimate goal of separate development: a
South Africa in which there are no black South Africans, but only black
"guest workers" linked through the bond of nationality to a number of
black mini-states carved out of the original boundaries of South Africa.
This is why the nationality issue assumed such important dimensions in
the pre-independence period. If Transkeian nationality had not been
compulsorily extended to all persons connected with Transkei, however
remotely, it might have been possible to view Transkeian independence
as a simple achievement of statehood. But once South Africa set the de-
nationalization of all persons ethnically or culturally linked with Transkei
as the price for independence, the goal of recognition became impossible.
Transkei was not recognized by any state other than South Africa.
Moreover, both the General Assembly1" and the Security Council1 6 con-
demned Transkeian independence and called upon states not to recognize
Transkei. This was obviously a disappointment to the South African Gov-
ernment, but as a result of the experience, it appears to have dropped all
interest in recognition. Consequently, there was little talk of recognition
at the time of Bophuthatswana's independence in December 1977, and
the subject was not raised at all when Venda became independent in
1979. One must conclude, therefore, that while recognition remains a top
priority for Namibia, the South African Government has abandoned all
such hopes for its own homelands.
Despite the failure to secure international recognition of the home-
lands, support for this policy continued up to the end of the Vorster
Administration. Indeed, in the twilight months of this administration, the
most extreme formulation of the homelands policy was enunciated by Dr.
C.P. Mulder, in his capacity as Minister of Bantu Administration and De-
velopment. On February 7, 1978, Dr. Mulder stated in Parliament:
[I1f our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black
people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South
African citizenship .... [E]very black man in South Africa will even-
tually be accommodated in some independent new state in this
honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this
Parliament to accommodate these people politically."
C. Homelands Policy under Mr. P.W. Botha
It is difficult to describe the extent to which Mr. P.W. Botha remains
15. G.A. Res. 31/6A, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
16. S.C. Res. 402, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Dec. 1976) 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32
(1976).
17. 72 House of Assembly Debates, col. 579, Feb. 7, 1978.
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committed to the homelands policy of his predecessors. The following evi-
dence suggests that the Vorster homelands policy still prevails.
1. A "Twelve-Point" policy plan, announced by Mr. Botha in 1979
and approved by National Party Provincial Congresses, appears to con-
firm the homelands policy, albeit in highly ambiguous language. Points
two and three of this plan affirm:
(2) The acceptance of vertical differentiation with the built-in prin-
ciple of self-determination on as many levels as possible.
(3) The creation of constitutional structures for the black nations to
make possible the highest degree of self-government, within States
that have already been consolidated as far as is practicable. 8
That these points are in line with the policy of his predecessor was con-
firmed by Mr. Botha himself in Parliament on April 30, 1980.1"
2. The Status of Venda Act" conferred independence on Venda on
September 13, 1979 on the same terms as Transkei and Bophuthatswana.
From this it appears that the denationalization of all persons ethnically
or linguistically linked to a homeland still remains the price for
independence.
3. Dr. C.P. Mulder's statement of February 7, 1978 remains un-
altered, despite many demands, particularly from black leaders, for its
repudiation. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and De-
velopment and Dr. Mulder's successor, has on occasion expressed guarded
criticism of denationalization, but he has yet to repudiate Dr. Mulder's
statement. In any event, such rhetoric can hardly be taken seriously in
the light of the enactment of the Status of Venda Act, which confirms the
policy of denationalization on the ground of race. In passing, it might be
mentioned that in February 1979, Dr. Schalk van der Merwe, then Minis-
ter of Health, questioned the correctness of Dr. Mulder's statement when
he said, first, that he could not foresee the day when there would be no
black South Africans, and second, that no black man would be forced to
give up his citizenship.2 It would, however, be wrong to attach too much
significance to this statement as Dr. van der Merwe has not been closely
involved with black administration and cannot be said to have been pro-
nouncing on government policy on the occasion in question.
4. The Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Consti-
tution of 198022 and the legislation flowing from this report"' make no
provision for Black participation in the central political process of the
18. The "Twelve Points" are fully set out in - House of Assembly Debates, cols.
3278-79, Mar. 21, 1980.
19. - House of Assembly Debates, col. 5149, Apr. 30, 1980.
20. Act 107 of 1979.
21. 79 House of Assembly Debates, col. 972, Feb. 19, 1979.
22. Republic of South Africa Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution, Interim Re-
port 6 (Chairman, Hon. A.L. Schlebusch, M.P.) (unpublished pamphlet).
23. Rm. S. AFR. CONST., 5th Amend., Act 101 of 1980.
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Republic. This legislation creates a nominated President's Council, with
advisory powers, whose membership is confined to Whites, Coloreds,
Asians, and Chinese. By implication, Blacks are still expected to exercise
their political rights only in independent or self-governing homelands.
At present there appears to be a lull in the implementation of the
homelands policy. This may be ascribed to a number of factors. First,
there is currently no self-governing homeland willing to opt for indepen-
dence. Ciskei, which was widely believed to be the next in line for in-
dependence, appears to be reconsidering its position in the light of the
Quail Commission Report which labelled independence an "unattractive
option" unless a number of strict conditions are met. These included the
condition "that citizenship on satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives
non-resident Ciskeians the choice of either Ciskeian or South African sta-
tus or both.'24 Second, aspirant independent homelands appear to have
been deterred from opting for independence by the failure of Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, and Venda to secure international recognition."5 Third,
the South African Government is awaiting the report of a commission of
inquiry on the consolidation of the homelands, under the chairmanship of
Mr. H.J.D. van der Walt, M.P., before pressing ahead with the creation of
new independent homelands. As the Prime Minister has indicated that
the government is prepared to consider a consolidation involving more
land than that set aside in the 1936 Land Act, this commission's report
may have far-reaching implications.2"
It is not impossible that the Botha Government is reconsidering the
homelands policy in the light of altered circumstances. Mr. Botha has
spoken repeatedly in the past months of a "constellation" of states for
southern Africa, but as yet he has declined to spell out the full implica-
tions of such an arrangement.27 Such a constellation or confederation of
states is, of course, compatible with a policy of acceleration of indepen-
dence for self-governing territories. This was emphasized by Mr. van der
Walt, Chairman of the Consolidation Commission, in May 1980. Speaking
during the vote on the Department of Co-operation and Development, he
said:
The stated policy and priorities of the Government are to develop the
various national States into full-fledged States .... The National
Party has a specific policy, a policy which amounts to a division of
power .... [W]e cannot share power in a unitary State in South
Africa. Therefore the National Party's policy of the division of power
gives rise to the Black national States.
24. CISKEI COMMISSION, THE QUAIL REPORT 127 (1980). But see Postscript to this arti-
cle, page 36 infra.
25. Id. at 120-23.
26. 33 SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 302 (1979).
27. For a general discussion of this proposal, see THE CONSTELLATION OF STATES (W.
Bretenbach ed. 1980).
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The effect of the National Party's policy . . . will require a fur-
ther thorough investigation into the confederal approaches in order to
achieve what we would like to achieve. We shall have to determine
what that would involve for us. If that is indeed our policy, the system
of a constellation of States on a confederal basis could only develop to
its full potential if we were dealing with independent States in which
everyone sharing in that option is equal.18
This statement must, however, be compared with statements by Mr. P.W.
Botha himself suggesting that the government might be prepared to ac-
cept a confederation comprising independent homelands and a South Af-
rica which would include non-independent homelands.2 This suggests
that some form of participation may yet be envisaged for Blacks attached
to non-independent homelands in the South African political system it-
self, a possibility that derives some support from the recent recognition
on the part of the government of the permanency of the urban black com-
munity in the Republic.
The above examination of the present situation shows that it is at
least possible that the Botha Government is not irrevocably committed to
the pursuit of the Verwoerd/Vorster homelands ideology envisaging a
South Africa in which there are no black nationals with claims to partici-
pation in the Republic's political system. On the other hand, the home-
lands legislative structure, which has been augmented since 1978, contin-
ues to show support for this ideology. In these circumstances the outside
observer can only conclude that Dr. C.P. Mulder's statement of February
7, 1978 continues to reflect long-term National Party policy.
II. HOMELANDS INDEPENDENCE
To date three homelands have become independent: Transkei (1976),
Bophuthatswana (1977), and Venda (1979). In all three instances the
same procedure has been followed for the granting of independence. 30
The South African Parliament passed a statute providing for the inde-
pendence of the territory with effect from the day of independence; and
the legislative assembly of the territory itself enacted a constitution
which became effective on the date of independence. The three indepen-
dence-conferring statutes were substantially similar in content, but the
constitutions adopted by the new states varied in form and substance.
A. Independence-Conferring Statutes
The standard form of independence-conferring statute is the concise
Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976, which served as a model for subse-
28. - House of Assembly Debates, cols. 5737-38, May 7, 1980.
29. - House of Assembly Debates, col. 250, Feb. 6, 1980; - House of Assembly
Debates, cols. 5162-63, Apr. 30, 1980 (Mr. P.W. Botha); - House of Assembly Debates,
cols. 577-78, May 7, 1980 (Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof).
30. For a discussion of this subject, see Dugard, Transkei Becomes Independent, 30
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, 26 (1976); Booysen, Wiechers, van Wyk, &
Bretenbach, Comments on the Independence and Constitution of Transkei, [19761 S. AFR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
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quent grants of independence to Bophuthatswana and Venda. It pro-
vided, inter alia:
1. Transkei is 'hereby declared to be a sovereign independent
State and shall cease to be part of the Republic of South Africa' (sec-
tion 1);
2. Any law in force in Transkei prior to independence shall con-
tinue in force in Transkei until repealed or amended by the compe-
tent authority in Transkei (section 2);
3. All treaties binding on the Republic prior to independence of
Transkei and capable of being applied to Transkei shall be binding on
Transkei, but the Government of Transkei may denounce any such
treaty (section 4);S1
4. All agreements entered into between the Government of the
Republic and the Government of Transkei before independence shall
remain in force as international treaties (section 5);
5. Every person falling into certain defined categories shall be a
citizen of Transkei and shall cease to be a South African citizen (sec-
tion 6).3'
B. Homelands Constitutions
The Transkei Constitution"8 is modelled substantially on that of
South Africa. The President of Transkei has powers similar to those of
the State President of South Africa and is advised by an Executive Coun-
cil composed of Ministers of State. He is not therefore an Executive Pres-
ident de jure, but since Chief Kaiser Matanzima became President of
Transkei in 1979 it appears that he has played an important de facto
political role which goes beyond that contemplated by the Constitution.
The Parliament of Transkei, which is declared to be a sovereign legisla-
ture, consists of the President and a single house designated as the Na-
tional Assembly. The Assembly has 150 members, comprising 75 chiefs
and 75 elected members.
The Republic of Bopthuthatswana Constitution Act" differs substan-
tially from that of Transkei. The Head of State is the President, who is
also executive head of the government. The legislature-the National
Assembly-comprises forty-eight nominated members, forty-eight elected
members, and three members designated by the President who must be
persons with special knowledge or experience, but need not be citizens of
Bophuthatswana. Significantly, the constitution contains a bill of rights
modeled on the European Convention on Human Rights, which guaran-
tees equality before the law and the most fundamental human freedoms.
31. For additional treatment of the subject of succession to treaties, see Dugard,
Matters Affecting Succession, 30 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRIcAN LAw 26 (1976).
32. This citizenship provision is fully examined in section III infra.
33. REP. TRANsKE CONsT. AcT OF 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1136 (1976).
The Constitution is closely examined by Booysen et al., note 30 supra.
34. See Wiechers & van Wyk, The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution, [19771
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 85.
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The Republic of Venda Constitution Act"8 provides for an Executive
President and a National Assembly, the latter which is to constitute the
"sovereign legislative authority." The National Assembly is to comprise
forty-two nominated members (chiefs and designated members), forty-
two elected members, and three members nominated by the President by
reason of their special knowledge or experience. Like the Transkei Con-
stitution, this constitution contains no bill of rights.
C. Treaties
South Africa entered into a number of agreements with each home-
land prior to its independence. Broadly, these agreements" deal with
matters affecting agriculture, forestry, economic and industrial develop-
ment, the accession of officials, the employment of the new ,state's citizens
in the Republic and vice versa, educational aid, defense, the supply of
electricity, health services, travel documents and ports of entry, mining
rights, postal and telecommunication services, welfare institutions, public
roads, transportation, air services, and railways. The non-aggression pacts
concluded with each independent homeland are of special interest. In
these agreements, the parties renounce the use of force in their relations
with each other and agree that neither party shall allow its territory to be
used as a base by any state, government, organization, or person for mili-
tary, subversive, or other hostile actions against the other party. Extradi-
tion agreements have also been entered into between South Africa and
each independent homeland.8 7 These agreements follow the normal pat-
tern and exclude the extradition of political offenders.
III. HOMELANDS AND CITIZENSHIP
A. Citizenship and Nationality
There is much confusion in South Africa today over the policies of
the South African Government with respect to citizenship. In part this
confusion results from the failure of legislation to draw a distinction be-
tween "nationality" and "citizenship." Neither the South African Citizen-
ship Act 44 of 1949, nor the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970,
which together constitute the governing "citizenship law," draws any such
distinction, and both use the term "citizenship" where "nationality"
would be more correct.
35. The text is reprinted in CONSTrrTIONS OF DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGN-
TIES (A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein eds. 1977).
36. The agreements with Transkei are published in Government Notice 1976, Govern-
ment Gazette 5320, Oct. 22, 1976 (Regulation Gazette 2384); Government Notice 2496, Gov-
ernment Gazette 5823, Dec. 6, 1977 (Regulation Gazette 2569); Government Notice 2014,
Government Gazette 6652, Sept. 12, 1979 (Regulation Gazette 2861).
37. Transkei: Proclamation R329, Government Gazette 5813, Nov. 25, 1977 (Regulation
Gazette 2565); Bophuthatswana Proclamation R375, Government Gazette 5846, Dec. 30,
1977 (Regulation Gazette 2582); Venda: Proclamation R210, Government Gazette 6652,
Sept. 12, 1979 (Regulation Gazette 2861).
38. For further views on this subject, see Barrie, A Legal View of Transkeian Recogni-
tion and So-called Statelessness, 33 POLrTKON 1 (1976); Dean, A Citizen of Transkei, 11
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFa. 57 (1978); Heyne, A Transkeian Citizen of South African Na-
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Nationalitysa is essentially a term of international law and denotes
that there is a legal connection between the individual and the state. In
practice this means that a South African national may travel on a South
African passport and is entitled to protection by the South African Gov-
ernment if he is injured in another country. Citizenship, on the other
hand, is a term best used to describe the status of an individual who en-
joys civil and political rights in a particular state.40 In South Africa,
Blacks are not really citizens since they do not exercise full civil and po-
litical rights in the central political process. In order to overcome this
injustice, the South African Government has resorted to the device of giv-
ing Blacks citizenship, that is, political rights, in the homelands.
The present situation can be summarized in the following way: all
white, colored, and Indian South Africans are South African nationals.
Similarly, all black South Africans who are not ethnically connected with
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda are South African nationals. Within
South Africa there are, however, different types of citizens: those who
exercise political rights in the central political process (Whites); those
whom the government plans to incorporate into the central political pro-
cess (Coloreds and Indians); and those who have political rights in the
non-independent homelands (Blacks). From this it will be seen that na-
tionality is a wider concept than citizenship. All South Africans are South
African nationals, but Blacks and Whites enjoy different citizenship
rights.
When a homeland becomes independent the persons connected with
it become nationals of the new state. This is in essence what happened
when Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda became independent. All
persons who had previously been "citizens" of these homelands, or who
were ethnically or linguistically connected with them, however remotely,
ceased to be South African nationals. By losing their nationality in this
way Blacks connected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda not
only lost their right to exercise the privileges of South African nationality
(such as diplomatic protection and passports), but in addition they lost
all claim to participate in the central political process in South Africa as
tionality, 26 TYDSKRIF viR HEDENDAAGSE RoMEINS-HOLLANDsE REG. 44 (1963); Norman, note
2 supra; Olivier, Bophuthatswana Nationality, [1977] S. APR. Y.B. INT'L L. 108; Olivier,
Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, [1976] id. at 143; Venter, Bantoe Burgerskap en
Tuisland Burgerskap, 38 TYvSKRIF viR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINs-HOLLANDSE REG. 239 (1975).
39. For a clear analysis of the distinction between nationality and citizenship, see
Koessler, "Subject," "Citizen," "National," and "Permanent Allegiance," 56 YALE L.J. 58
(1946). See also P. Wis, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d ed.
1979).
40. According to Koessler:
'Citizenship' in modern usage is not a synonym of nationality or a term gener-
ally used for the status of belonging to a state, but means specifically the pos-
session by the person under consideration, of the highest or at least of a certain
higher category of political rights and (or) duties, established by the nation's or
state's constitution.
Koessler, supra note 39, at 63.
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full South African citizens at some future date. The main objection to
denationalization of the kind that occurred when Transkei, Bophuthat-
swana, and Venda became independent is thus that Blacks become for-
eigners in South Africa with as little claim to participation in the political
process in South Africa as visiting Germans or Malawians. This objection
to homelands independence was eloquently stated by Bishop Desmond
Tutu shortly before Transkei became independent:
Overnight they will become foreigners in what for many of them has
been the land of their birth and be forced to adopt the citizenship of a
country that many do not know at all and in whose creation they have
played no part at all. They have contributed in their various ways to
the prosperity of this beloved South Africa and now it seems at the
stroke of a pen they will forfeit a cherished birthright.4
An emotional argument, perhaps. But it captures the real mood of Blacks
toward independence and it is one that unites both urban and homeland
Blacks in their opposition to the National Party Government.
Government policy toward Coloreds, Indians, and Blacks in South
Africa appears to be as follows. Coloreds and Indians will be accomodated
in some new political dispensation which will give the appearance of po-
litical participation. Thus they will become full nationals and citizens.
Blacks, on the other hand, cannot be given political rights in South Africa
so they cannot become full citizens of South Africa. Consequently, they
must be forced to become nationals, with full citizenship rights, of some
new state. In the fullness of time, if government policy succeeds, all
homelands will become independent and there will no longer be any black
nationals in South Africa with claims to political rights. Blacks, particu-
larly urban Blacks, will thus occupy the same position politically as, for
example, British nationals in South Africa who retain their British na-
tionality and therefore cannot vote in South Africa."' This will allow the
South African Government to argue that there are no black South Afri-
cans, that all Blacks in South Africa are foreigners in much the same way
as there are foreign migrant workers from Turkey in Germany and from
Algeria in France. This will be the argument used to counter hostile at-
tacks from the international community over the denial of political rights
to Blacks in South Africa.
B. Citizenship and the Independence-Conferring Statutes
All three independence-conferring statutes contain a provision (sec-
tion 6) which reads as follows:
41. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), May 1, 1976, at 6.
42. A denationalized black South African is in fact worse off than a British national.
While the latter may become a South African national by Naturalization, the former will
not be able to do so, since only a person who "is likely to become readily assimilated with
the European inhabitants of the Republic" is eligible for citizenship by naturalization. Sec.
4(c)(b) of the Aliens Act 1 of 1937, read with sec. 10(1)(c) of the South African Citizenship
Act 44 of 1949. See van Wyk, The Ebb and Flow of South African Citizenship, [1978] S.
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 148.
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Every person falling in any of the categories of persons defined in
Schedule B shall be a citizen of the Transkei [Bophuthatswana,
Venda] and shall cease to be a South African citizen....
No citizen of the Transkei [Bophuthatswana, Venda] resident in the
Republic at the commencement at this Act shall, except as regards
citizenship, forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits by reason
only of the other provisions of this Act.
Schedule B varies according to the ethnic composition of each homeland.
Schedule B of the Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976 provides:
Categories of persons who in terms of section 6 are citizens of the
Transkei and cease to be South African citizens:
(a) every person who was a citizen of the Transkei in terms of any
law at the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in the Transkei of parents one or both of
whom were citizens of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(c) every person born outside the Transkei whose father was a citi-
zen of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(d) every person born out of wedlock (according to custom or other-
wise) and outside the Transkei whose mother was a citizen of the
Transkei at the time of his birth;
(e) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the Transkei for
a period of at least five years, irrespective of whether or not such pe-
riod includes any period prior to the commencement of this Act, and,
on application in the prescribed manner, has been granted citizenship
of the Transkei by the competent authority in the Transkei;
(f) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of Transkei in
terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), and speaks a language used
by the Xhosa or Sotho speaking section of the population of the
Transkei, including any dialect of any such language;
(g) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, and is not a citizen of the Trans-
kei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and who is related
to any member of the population contemplated in paragraph (f) or
has identified himself with any part of such population or is culturally
or otherwise associated with any member of part of such population.
Schedule B of the Status of Venda Act 107 of 1979, which is substan-
tially similar to that of Bophuthatswana, provides:
Categories of persons who in terms of section 6 are citizens of Venda
and cease to be South African citizens:
(a) every person who was a citizen of Venda in terms of any law at
the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in or outside Venda, either before or after the
commencement of this Act, of parents one or both of whom were citi-
zens of Venda at the time of his birth, who is not a citizen of a terri-
tory within the Republic of South Africa and is not a citizen of Venda
in terms of paragraph (a);
(c) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in Venda for a pe-
riod of at least five years, irrespective of whether or not such period
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includes any period prior to the commencement of this Act, and, on
application in the prescribed manner, has been granted citizenship of
Venda by the competent authority in Venda;
(d) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of Venda in terms
of paragraph (a), (b) or (c) and speaks a language used by members of
any tribe which forms part of the population of Venda, including any
dialect of any such language;
(e) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa and is not a citizen of Venda in
terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) and who is related to any mem-
ber of the population contemplated in paragraph (d) or has identified
himself with any part of such population or is culturally or otherwise
associated with any member of such population.
Paragraph (a) in these schedules requires a special explanation. Prior
to Transkeian independence "every Xhosa-speaking Bantu person in the
Republic" not belonging to another homeland (for example, Ciskei) was a
"citizen" of Transkei in terms of section 7 of the Transkei Constitution
Act 48 of 1963. Similarly, before Venda and Bophuthatswana became in-
dependent, every person connected with the homeland in question by lan-
guage, culture, or race became a "citizen" of that homeland in terms of
section 3 of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970. Consequently,
prior to independence all persons linguistically or culturally connected
with the homeland were already citizens of the territory but nationals43
of South Africa. On independence such persons became both citizens and
nationals of the homeland and ceased to be South African nationals.
The independence-conferring statutes carefully refrain from depriv-
ing persons of South African nationality on grounds of race. Instead they
prescribe language and culture as the criteria for denationalization."4
There can, however, be no doubt that in practice they are intended to
apply to Blacks only as this accords with declared government policy.
Certainly there is no known instance in which a white, colored, or Asian
person connected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda has been de-
prived of his nationality since the conferment of independence on these
states.
The Status of Bophuthatswana Act differs from the other two inde-
pendence-conferring statutes in that it provides that a citizen of
Bophuthatswana may renounce his citizenship after independence on
43. This is made clear by section 3(4) of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970,
which reads in pertinent part:
A citizen of a territorial authority area [homeland] shall not be regarded as an
alien in the Republic and shall, by virtue of his citizenship of a territory form-
ing part of the Republic, remain for all purposes a citizen of the Republic and
shall be accorded full protection according to international law by the
Republic.
44. Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, supra note 38, at 152-54, em-
phasizes this point, but takes no account of the practical implementation of these statutes.
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conditions agreed upon between the governments of South Africa and
Bophuthatswana."' This measure, envisaging a reversion to South African
nationality, has been rendered largely unnecessary by a 1978 amendment
to the Black States Citizenship Act which allows a national of an inde-
pendent homeland to recover his South African nationality by becoming a
citizen of a non-independent homeland." Reversion to South African na-
tionality in such a case is, however, contemplated only as a temporary
measure which will continue until the homeland whose citizenship he has
acquired itself becomes independent. 7 By December 31, 1979, 1,474 per-
sons had regained their South African nationality in this way.4 s
C. Denationalization on the Ground of Race as a Violation of Inter-
national Law
Although traditional international law regards both the conferment
of nationality and the withdrawal of nationality as falling within a state's
domestic domain, in recent times it has been authoritatively argued that
"denationalization measures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other re-
lated grounds are impermissible under contemporary international law."
4
'
This view is disputed by some South African writers.50 Nevertheless it is
a widely accepted emerging norm or customary rule which derives sup-
port from:
1. the widespread opposition to the 1941 Nazi decree which dena-
tionalized German Jews;61
2. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,8 which
declares that 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality';
3. Article 5(d)(iii) of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,'8 in which states under-
take to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,
equality before the law, 'notably in enjoyment of the right to national-
ity'; and
4. Article 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 4
which provides that a 'Contracting State may not deprive any person
or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or
45. Sec. 6(3), Status of Bophuthatswana Act 89 of 1977.
46. Sec. 1 of the Black States Citizenship Amendment Act 13 of 1978, amending sec. 3
of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970.
47. 72 House of Assembly Debates, cots. 558, 560, 579, Feb. 7, 1978.
48. - House of Assembly Debates, Questions, col. 327, Mar. 10, 1980.
49. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: the Protection of
the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 958 (1974). See also P. WEis, supra
note 39, at 123, 125, 126.
50. Barrie, supra note 38, at 34; Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality,
supra note 38, at 147, 154.
51. Mann, The Present Validity of Nazi Nationality Laws, 89 L.Q. Rzv. 194, 199-200
(1973).
52. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
53. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 352 (1966).
54. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 29, 1961, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 9/15 (1961). This convention has not entered into force.
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political grounds.'
As shown above, none of the independence-conferring statutes ex-
pressly provides for denationalization on the ground of race, but by impli-
cation they are designed to apply to Blacks only. And this is borne out by
their implementation in practice. Consequently, it is highly arguable that
the compulsory denationalization of some seven million persons" con-
nected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda by the South African
legislature violates international law. Certainly this factor contributed to
the non-recognition of the homelands in question as independent states.
D. Homelands Independence and Statelessness
That contemporary international law disapproves of statelessness if
shown by attempts to prevent it through multilateral conventions. Most
important is the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness," which
was opened for signature in 1961 but has not yet come into force. Other
treaties are the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,"
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 6 and the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.69 South Africa is not a party to any of
the above conventions save for the Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons."
As far as the South African Government is concerned, statelessness
does not occur as a result of denationalization caused by homelands inde-
pendence. This argument is premised on the fact that the independence-
conferring statutes all confer the nationality of the newly independent
state upon persons deprived of their South African nationality." The
South African Government might even argue that in granting indepen-
dence it has complied with the spirit of Article 10 of the Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, which provides:
(1) Every treaty between contracting states providing for the trans-
fer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no per-
son shall become stateless as a result of the transfer ....
(2) In the absence of such provisions the contracting state to which
territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall con-
fer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become state-
less as a result of the transfer or acquisition.
55. The 1978 population estimates for the three territories were: Transkei, 4,142,800;
Bophuthatswana, 2,219,600; and Venda, 473,200. 33 SURVEY OF RACE RRLATIONS IN SOUTH
AFRICA 71 (1979).
56. Note 54 supra.
57. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S.
117. This convention came into force in June 1960.
58. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
This convention came into force in April 1954.
59. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
60. Van Wyk, The South African Passport, [1976] S. AFR. Y.B. Iwr'L L. 212, 221.
61. See Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, supra note 38, at 154.
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Two arguments may, however, be raised in support of the view that
homelands independence results in statelessness. First, it may be argued
that a black person who has never lived in the independent homeland
lacks the necessary "genuine link" or "social fact of attachment" pre-
scribed as a requirement for the bond of nationality by the International
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case.6 2 Such a person would not be-
come a national of the newly independent state, but would nevertheless
cease to be a South African national. Under international law he would
therefore be stateless. Second, independent homelands are inevitably
doomed to non-recognition. Consequently, third states will not recognize
their competence to protect their "nationals" abroad, as their very exis-
tence is denied. At the same time, South Africa is unlikely to exercise any
diplomatic protection over them. Thus for practical purposes, nationals of
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda are stateless. They are no longer
South African nationals and their own states are unrecognized. By pro-
moting such a situation, in the knowledge that independence will not be
accompanied by recognition, it may be argued that the South African
Government is creating a large-scale situation of statelessness.
E. Privileges Retained by Denationalized Persons with Special Refer-
ence to "Section 10 Rights"
All three independence-conferring statutes provide in section 6 that
no citizen of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda, resident in the
Republic of South Africa at the time of independence, "shall, except as
regards citizenship, forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits."
This provision is generally viewed as preserving the so-called section
10 rights of denationalized Blacks. Section 10(1) of the Blacks (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945'3 prohibits every Black from being in
any prescribed urban area for more than seventy-two hours unless:
(a) he has resided in that area continuously since birth; or
(b) he has worked continuously in that area for the same employer
for ten years; or he has lawfully resided continuously in that area for
at least fifteen years; or
(c) the Black is the wife, unmarried daughter or minor son of a male
falling under (a) or (b); or
(d) permission has been granted for him to be in the area by a la-
bour bureau.
As employment opportunities outside the cities are limited, those Blacks
who qualify to remain permanently in an urban area in terms of section
10(1)(a), (b), or (c) constitute a privileged class. These rights are becom-
ing even more precious as government policy makes its increasingly diffi-
62. (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 23. Weis states: "The tendency to as-
similate de facto stateless persons . . . to de jure stateless persons, is further evidence of
the importance of the question whether the nationality which an individual possesses in law
is effective." P. Wzis, supra note 39, at 202.
63. Act 25 of 1945, as amended. Section 10 in its present form was first inserted in
1952.
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cult for rural Blacks to acquire section 10(1) rights. This is because rural
Blacks are generally admitted to urban areas by labor bureaus under sec-
tion 10(1)(d) for one-year contract periods only and, although this con-
tract period may be renewed, the technical interruption in employment
prevents a rural Black from acquiring rights under section 10(1)(b)." Sec-
tion 10(1) is not constitutionally guaranteed, but it has acquired a special
status in the black community as it offers a semblance of security in an
insecure world. Hence the saving provision in section 6 of the indepen-
dence-conferring statutes is of great importance.
Although section 6 does preserve the "section 10 rights" of Trans-
keians, Bophuthatswanans, and Vendans who were alive at the time of
independence, it does not extend its protection to the children of such
persons born in South Africa after independence. This is the result of a
1978 amendment" to the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act which
places the children of denationalized persons in the position of foreigners
in respect of their right to remain in urban areas. This enactment seri-
ously undermines recent initiatives of the government to give greater se-
curity to urban Blacks.
In 1978 the government, which has vigorously opposed the granting
of freehold rights to Blacks in urban areas, introduced a major conces-
sion: home ownership on a ninety-nine year leasehold basis. According to
this scheme, Blacks who qualify to remain in urban areas in terms of sec-
tion 10(1)(a) or (b) may obtain ninety-nine year leasehold rights to prop-
erty in such areas.6 This plan is designed to afford permanency of resi-
dence to black urban dwellers, but it has been seriously undermined by
the fact that the children of denationalized Blacks will apparently not be
able to take advantage of the lease.e7 As the veteran civil rights parlia-
mentarian, Mrs. Helen Suzman, M.P., stated when this matter was de-
bated in Parliament: "The child born after independence .. . is not a
South African citizen and therefore cannot enter or be in a prescribed
area. How can that person then acquire rights of leasehold when. . . that
person may not even be in the area?"" Government spokesmen insist
that it is not the intention of the government to deny leasehold rights to
64. Proclamation 74, Government Gazette 2029, Mar. 29, 1968 (Regulation 13(d)).
65. Sec. 2 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 12 of 1978 amending sec. 12 of Act 25 of
1945. For a discussion of the implications of this measure, see 72 House of Assembly
Debates, cols. 470, 519, 629, 639, 648, Feb. 6-8, 1978.
66. Sec. 6A of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, as introduced by
sec. 2 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978. For further material on this
subject, see 32 SURVEY OF RAcE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRiCA 325 (1978).
67. Section 1 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, as amended by
section 1(d) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978, provides that a quali-
fied person in relation to a right of leasehold means a black person qualified to remain in an
urban area in terms of section 10(1)(a) or (b) of Act 25 of 1945. As descendants of denation-
alized Blacks do not acquire section 10(1)(a) or (b) rights in terms of section 12(1) of Act 25
of 1945 it follows logically that they do not qualify for 99-year leasehold rights.
68. 74 House of Assembly Debates, col. 9252, June 13, 1978.
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the descendants of denationalized persons,69 but they have consistently
refused to bring the law into line with declared intent."0 This problem
illustrates the dilemma posed by denationalization to "progressive" Na-
tionalists determined to advance the position of urban Blacks. All reforms
aimed at improving the quality of life of urban Blacks relate to the grant-
ing of greater security of residence, yet at the same time these proposed
reforms are undermined by denationalization which inevitably promotes
the maximum degree of insecurity.
To date, the section providing for the non-forfeiture of "existing
rights, privileges or benefits" has come before the Supreme Court in only
one instance and was on this occasion interpreted generously. In Ex Parte
Moseneke, the Transvaal Provincial Division held that the bar to the
admission of aliens or persons not lawfully admitted to the Republic for
permanent residence to practice as attorneys in the Republic did not ap-
ply to a national of Bophuthatswana resident in Pretoria, as he did not
forfeit any existing rights, other than citizenship, when he was deprived
of his South African citizenship.
F. Privileges Acquired by Denationalized Persons
Under international law a state is required to accord a certain mini-
mum standard of treatment to aliens admitted to its territory. This
means that where a state has a low standard of justice towards its own
nationals, an alien's position is a privileged one.72 This "minimum stan-
dard of civilization '"7 is not an exacting one and has been described as
simply "the standard of the 'reasonable state,' reasonable, that is to say,
according to the notions that are accepted in our modern civilization. '"'
Although the precise limits of this standard are not clear, it is accepted
that a state violates its international obligations, and thus incurs respon-
sibility to the state of which the alien is a national, when it denies an
alien basic human rights on the ground of his race.75
While the "minimum standard of treatment" is scrupulously ob-
served by the South African Government in the case of aliens from most
states, it is certainly not respected in the case of Transkei, Bophuthat-
swana, and Venda - and possibly Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.
The reasons for this are twofold.
First, most of South Africa's discriminatory laws apply to Blacks per
se and not to Blacks as South African nationals. In terms of the Popula-
tion Registration Act, which governs race classification in South Africa, a
"black person" (previously "Bantu") is defined as a "person who is, or is
generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Af-
69. Id. col. 9234 (Dr. C.P. Mulder); The Star (Johannesburg), Mar. 2, 1979, at 3.
70. 74 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 9251, 9261, June 13, 1978.
71. 4 S. APR. L. REP. 884 (1979).
72. J. BRixRLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 278 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
73. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
74. J. BRizRLY, supra note 72, at 279-80.
75. 8 DIGESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (M. Whiteman ed. 1967).
VOL. 10:11
DENATIONALIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
rica. "7' This definition is referred to in a number of discriminatory stat-
utes. Other statutes contain their own definitions of "Black" but follow
the formula employed by the Population Registration Act. Thus most dis-
criminatory laws apply not to black South African citizens but to any
persons who are members of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. The
following statutes, for example, affect black aliens as well as South Afri-
can Blacks: the Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Docu-
ments) Act, 7 which obliges Blacks to carry identity documents (passes)
which must be produced on demand by a policeman; the Blacks (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act,7 8 which regulates the residence rights of Blacks
in urban areas; the Education and Training Act,7 9 which provides for sep-
arate schools for Blacks; and the Black (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act,80
which deprives Blacks of the right to obtain court interdicts pending a
determination of their legal rights affecting residence.
It is possible, however, that Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda
waived the protection against discriminatory treatment afforded by the
international minimum standard in their pre-independence agreements
with South Africa. In the Agreement between the Government of the Re-
public of South Africa and the Government of Transkei relating to the
Employment of Citizens of Transkei in the Republic of South Africa, it is
agreed in Article 1 that:
No citizen of Transkei engaged in Transkei for employment in the
Republic of South Africa shall enter the Republic of South Africa for
the purpose of taking up employment unless
(a) he complies with the laws and regulations relating to the admis-
sion to, residence in, and departure from the Republic of South
Africa .... 81
Similar agreements apply in respect of Bophuthatswana s2 and Venda.e0
Another accord, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic
of South Africa and the Government of Transkei relating to the Move-
ment of Citizens of Transkei and of the Republic of South Africa across
the Common Borders, provides in Article 1: "The movement to and the
sojourn in the Republic of South Africa of citizens of Transkei. . .shall
be governed by the laws and regulations governing the admission to, resi-
76. Act 30 of 1950, sec. 1. For a full description of the system of race classification in
South Africa, see J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGWs AND THE SouTH AFRIcAN LEGAL ORDER 59-63
(1978).
77. Act 67 of 1952, §§ 1, 3(1)(b)(ii), 13, 15.
78. Act 25 of 1945, §§ 1, 10, 12.
79. Act 90 of 1979.
80. Act 64 of 1956.
81. GN 1976, Government Gazette No. 5320, Oct. 22, 1976, at 16 (Regulation Gazette
2384). Emphasis added.
82. GN R2496, Government Gazette No. 5823, Dec. 6, 1977, at 22 (Regulation Gazette
2569).
83. GN R2014, Government Gazette No. 6652, Sept. 12, 1979, at 142 (Regulation
Gazette 2861).
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dence in and departure from the country .. "84 There are correspond-
ing provisions in the agreements with Bophuthatswana"' and Venda.8
These agreements are apparently intended to deal only with migrant
laborers in, and visitors to, the Republic of South Africa from Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, and Venda, but they are so widely phrased that it may
be contended that they constitute an agreement between South Africa
and her independent homelands to subject all the latters' nationals to
South Africa's discriminatory laws.
The second reason for noncompliance with the international mini-
mum standard probably is that the new black states in southern Africa
lack the political power to insist on compliance with the standard by the
South African authorities. In order to appreciate this, one has only to
compare and contrast the treatment of American Blacks visiting South
Africa with that of Transkei Blacks in the Republic. In this respect it
should be recalled that the failure of the South African Government to
accord the minimum standard of treatment to Transkeian nationals con-
tributed to Transkei's decision to break off diplomatic relations with
South Africa in 1978.87 More recently, Prime Minister George Matanzima
appealed to the South African Government to show the world that it rec-
ognized Transkei's sovereignty by treating Transkei nationals in the same
way as it treats other foreigners." South Africa and Transkei resumed
diplomatic relations in 1980.
It might be argued that nationals of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and
Venda are placed in a privileged position vis-&-vis other aliens in South
Africa by reason of the fact that they retain all their "rights, privileges or
benefits" that existed at the time of independence in terms of the inde-
pendence-conferring statutes. This is an untenable argument, as the
rights, privileges and benefits that accrue to black South Africans fall
short of the international minimum standard of treatment by virtue of
their discriminatory nature. In any event, as shown above, there is so
much uncertainty as to the scope and duration of these "existing rights,
privileges or benefits" that urban Blacks can hardly draw much comfort
from them. The meagre scope of the "preferential treatment" accorded to
citizens of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda is apparent from the
statement made in 1978 by Dr. C.P. Mulder (then Minister of Bantu Ad-
ministration and Development) to the effect that such persons enjoyed
"preferential treatment over foreign Blacks as to employment opportuni-
ties, extended right of entry, viz 14 days instead of 72 hours, admission to
84. GN 1976, Government Gazette No. 5320, Oct. 22, 1976, at 58 (Regulation Gazette
2384). Emphasis added.
85. GN R2496, Government Gazette No. 5823, Dec. 6, 1977, at 78-79 (Regulation
Gazette 2569).
86. GN R2014, Government Gazette No. 6652, Sept. 12, 1979, at 17 (Regulation Gazette
2861).
87. 12 S. AmR. REcoRD 34 (1978).
88. The Star (Johannesburg), Mar. 22, 1979, at 4.
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RSA through any place of entry while foreigners have to enter at specific
points which are manned by officials of the Department of the Interior,
etc."8 9 Such "preferential treatment" makes no attempt to exempt black
aliens from discriminatory and repressive laws and thus fails to meet the
requirements of the international minimum standard.
One must, therefore, conclude that denationalized Blacks from
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda are not accorded the minimum
standard of treatment required by international law. Consequently, they
get the worst of both worlds: loss of their "birthright" to participate in
the government and power processes of South Africa at some future date,
and denial of the standards of fair treatment which normally accrue to
aliens.
G. Deportation of Aliens
A number of statutes confer wide powers of deportation of aliens
upon the South African Government. These powers may be, and indeed
already have been, used in order to remove political opponents who have
been denationalized as a result of homelands independence. The two
main statutory provisions which permit action of this kind are the Admis-
sion of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act and the Internal Security
Act.
Section 45 of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation
Act empowers the Minister of the Interior "if he considers it to be in the
public interest" to order the removal from the Republic of "any person
who is not a South African citizen."" The decision of the Minister as to
whether such removal is or is not in the public interest "shall not be sub-
ject to appeal or to review by any court of law and no person shall be
furnished with' any reasons for such decision." This provision has already
been invoked against a denationalized urban dweller from Transkei. In
August 1978 Mr. Pindile Mfeti, a trade unionist from Germinston who
had previously been detained without trial under the security laws for 366
days, was deported to Transkei "in the public interest."' 1
Section 14 of the Internal Security Act" permits the deportation of a
non-South African citizen who is convicted of certain offenses under this
act or who is deemed by the state president to be an undesirable inhabi-
tant "because he is a communist." No prior notice to the person con-
cerned is required in the latter case. To date there is no record of this act
having been invoked against denationalized persons. Although little use
has been made of the deportation weapon in respect of denationalized
Blacks, it remains a constant threat to the security of those denational-
ized urban Blacks who actively oppose the South African Government.
89. 72 House of Assembly Debates, col. 542, Feb. 7, 1978.
90. Act 59 of 1972. Emphasis added.
91. The Star (Johannesburg), Aug. 2, 1978, at 5.
92. Act 44 of 1950 (formerly called the Suppression of Communism Act).
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H. Dual Nationality
International law accepts the notion of dual nationality, according to
which an individual may possess the nationality of more than one state."
If the South African Government had applied this principle to homelands
independence and allowed persons connected with Transkei to retain
their South African nationality while at the same time becoming nation-
als of Transkei, it would have avoided much hostile criticism."4 On the
other hand, that course would not have furthered the ultimate goal of a
South Africa with no black South African nationals. Hence such a solu-
tion was rejected.
More recently, there have been developments in several quarters
which suggest that the possibility of dual nationality has not been com-
pletely discarded. The initial impetus for this revival of interest in dual
nationality came from the report of the Quail Commission of Inquiry into
the future of the non-independent homeland of Ciskei. This report rec-
ommended that Ciskei should opt for independence only if "citizenship
on satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives non-resident Ciskeians the
choice of either Ciskeian or South African status or both."'"
The idea of a constellation or confederation of states for southern
Africa," which has figured prominently in the speeches of Prime Minister
Botha during the past year, carries with it implications for nationality.'
It has been suggested" that the government is considering a confederal
South African or southern African nationality in addition to homelands
nationality as a solution to the problem of denationalization which has
created so much bitterness among Blacks. Presumably some form of dual
nationality is contemplated in such a case, in terms of which Blacks from
independent homelands will retain their South African nationality or ac-
quire the nationality of a Confederation of Southern Africa, while at the
same time becoming nationals with full citizenship rights of the indepen-
dent homeland. This would be a recognizable form of dual nationality
and might be acceptable to Blacks-provided that it is not presented as a
final exclusion of Blacks from the South African body politic but rather
as a method for maintaining the link between such persons and South
Africa itself while a more viable political solution is planned. In this re-
93. 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTENATONAL LAw 685 (2d ed. 1970). Dual nationality gives rise
to a number of problems with the result that some states and jurists regard such a status as
undesirable. It is not disputed, however, that dual nationality is tolerated and permitted by
international law. See generally N. B A-YAAcov, DUAL NATIONALITY (1961); P. WEIS, supra
note 39, at 169-204.
94. As late as 1975 a leading academic lawyer, Dr. F. Venter of the University of Potch-
efstroom, stated that dual nationality was a possible solution in the case of urban Africans.
Venter, supra note 38, at 252.
95. THE QuAIL REPORT, supra note 24, at 127, para. 348(2).
96. For further information, see T)HE CONSTELLATION OF STATES, note 27 supra.
97. __ House of Assembly Debates, cols. 250-51, Feb. 6, 1980.
98. For the statement by the National Party Member of Parliament for Krugersdorp,
Mr. L. Wessels, M.P., see - House of Assembly Debates, cols. 5835-36, May 7, 1980.
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spect it differs fundamentally from the concept of "associate citizenship"
which is currently being mooted by the right-wing faction of the National
Party. According to this suggestion denationalized Blacks will qualify for
certain revocable privileges, such as passports, but will be denied any ex-
pectation of political participation in the government of South Africa.
Neither the concept of "confederal nationality" nor that of "associate cit-
izenship" has been fully spelled out so at this stage it is premature to
speculate as to the extent to which either resembles traditional dual
nationality.
Another factor which points in the direction of some form of dual
nationality is the government's declared intention of extending the pow-
ers of the elected black local government councils, known as Community
Councils. These councils, which have been established for Blacks in the
main urban areas of South Africa, provide evidence of the growing ac-
ceptance of the permanency of black urban residents and constitute rec-
ognition of the fact that the homelands governments cannot adequately
represent the interests of their "citizens" in the cities. Already nationals
of independent homelands who are resident within the area for which a
Community Council has been established enjoy the right to vote in Com-
munity Council elections." This is an anomalous situation as normally
aliens are denied the right to participate in local government as well as
national government. If the Community Councils are to become more
powerful it becomes still more anomalous to permit aliens, viz nationals
of independent homelands, to vote for and hold office in such councils.
On the other hand, if dual nationality were accorded to such persons
there would be nothing unusual about the exercise of citizenship rights in
local government in South Africa coupled with the exercise of full citizen-
ship rights in an independent homeland.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of nationality is central to the political future of South
Africa. If Blacks are accorded dual'nationality when "their" homelands
become independent, or are allowed to opt to retain South African na-
tionality, this will amount to an acknowledgement that Blacks are to be
considered for political rights in the South African body politic, albeit in
the future. On the other hand, if the present policy of denationalization is
continued, this will be seen as evidence of a determination to implement
the homelands policy along the lines expounded by Dr. C.P. Mulder in his
notorious statement of February 7, 1978.11" The National Party is clearly
locked in debate on this issue. A committee under the chairmanship of
Professor Charles Nieuwoudt of Pretoria University has recently ex-
amined the matter, but the outcome of the committee's deliberations is
unknown. In the meantime, the verligte (relatively moderate) faction of
the National Party advocates some form of confederal nationality, while
99. Sec. 3(5), Community Councils Act 125 of 1977.
100. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
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verkramptes (reactionaries) within the party press for "associate citizen-
ship," which from the available evidence seems to be nothing more than
denationalization in disguise. As the policy of denationalization is so fun-
damental to orthodox separate development ideology, any modification of
this policy will call in question the loyalty of the present government to
separate development (apartheid). This is why the future of separate de-
velopment itself hinges upon the debate over the issue of nationality for
Blacks in South Africa.
POSTSCRIr
Ciskei, at present a self-governing homeland, recently elected to be-
come independent. December 4, 1981 has been set for the inauguration of
the new "state." The independence-conferring statute has yet to be en-
acted and it is therefore not known what agreement has been reached
between the South African Government and the Ciskeian authorities on
the issue of nationality. Will Ciskeians be summarily deprived of their
South African nationality as has happened in the case of millions of
Blacks connected with Transkei, Bophutatswana, and Venda? Or will a
more equitable solution be found? The answer to these questions will not
only throw light on the future of separate development, but will demon-
strate the extent to which the South African Government is prepared to
take cognizance of contemporary norms of international law governing
nationality.
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